This paper investigates the existence of possible asymmetries in the Central Bank of Brazil's objectives. By assuming that the loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate from its target, we estimated a nonlinear reaction function which allows identifying and checking the statistical significance of asymmetric parameters in the monetary authority's preferences. For years 2000 to 2007, results indicate that the Central Bank of Brazil showed asymmetric preference over an above-target inflation rate. Given that this behavior may stem from policy decisions in periods of severe crises (e.g., in 2001 and in 2002), we restricted our sample to the 2004-2007 period. We did not find any empirical evidence of any type of asymmetry in the preferences over the stabilization of inflation and of the output gap for this period.
Introduction
Ever since the early 1990s the economic literature dealing with the analysis of monetary policy actions by way of reaction function estimates has been gaining momentum. Taylor (1993) rule is probably the most widely known specification of this reaction function in this literature. According to this rule, the monetary authority responds to deviations of output and of inflation from their targets through nominal interest rate fluctuations regarded as policy instrument. Another specification that has received considerable attention is the forward-looking reaction function proposed by Clarida et al. (1997 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 . In this type of policy rule, the policymaker adjusts the current interest rate by considering the future values expected for inflation and for the output gap. A common feature of these two types of interest rate rules is that they are linear functions relative to variables that describe economic conditions. This can be explained by the fact that both specifications are theoretically based upon the linearquadratic model, where the monetary authority's loss function is assumed to be quadratic and the equations describing the economic framework are linear.
Nevertheless, two theoretical approaches were developed recently which have challenged the linear-quadratic framework behind the linear reaction function. The first approach rejects the assumption that the economic framework is linear. Orphanides and Wieland (1999) derive optimal policy rules for the case in which the monetary authority presents a quadratic loss function and is faced up with a zone-linear Phillips curve that allows for nonlinearities in the short-term trade-off between inflation and output. Nobay and Peel (2000) assessed optimal discretionary monetary policy under a nonlinear Phillips curve and found that the monetary authority can no longer remove the inflation bias by establishing a target for the output that equals the natural rate. Dolado et al. (2005) demonstrate that the central bank's optimal reaction function for an economy with a nonlinear Phillips curve is a forward-looking interest rate rule that has been increased in order to include the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap.
The second theoretical approach considers that policymakers may have asymmetric preferences with regard to their objectives. According to Cukierman (2000) , politicians and the general public are often more averse to negative output gaps than to positive ones in relation to the potential output. The Federal Reserve's vice-chairman, Alan Blinder, asserted that "in most situations the CB will take far more political heat when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than when it eases preemptively to avoid higher unemployment " Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20) . Given that in democratic governments independent central banks are not totally insensitive to political organizations, this type of asymmetry may be seen in the policymaker's loss function.
In addition, in periods during which the monetary authority is more concerned with lending credibility to its disinflationary policy, the loss due to positive deviations of the inflation rate from its target is likely larger than that one resulting from negative deviations of the same magnitude.
The consequences of including asymmetric preferences in the monetary authority's loss function have been investigated by several authors. Cukierman (2000) demonstrates that when the policymaker is uncertain about the economic conditions and when he is more sensitive to negative output gaps, an inflation bias arises even when the target for the actual output is the potential output of the economy. This result has been supported by empirical evidence gathered by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) for a group of 22 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. Gerlach (2000) and Surico (2007) found out that the Federal Reserve was more worried about negative output gaps than about positive ones in the pre-1980 period. Bec et al. (2002) verified that the business cycle phase, measured by the output gap, has played an important role in the conduct of monetary policy by the central banks of Germany, USA and France. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003) provide evidence of nonlinearities regarding inflation and output gap in reaction functions estimated for Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA. Dolado et al. (2003) observed that Federal Reserve's preferences regarding inflation were asymmetric during the Volcker-Greespan era.
Following this line of research, the present paper seeks to estimate a nonlinear reaction function for the Central Bank of Brazil that allows testing the existence of asymmetries in their objectives regarding inflation and output during the inflation targeting regime. Taking the model proposed by Surico (2007) as our theoretical basis, we obtain an optimal monetary policy rule for the monetary authority considering that its loss function is potentially asymmetric. Given that the presence of asymmetries in objectives produces nonlinear responses of the interest rate to inflation and to the output gap, we checked whether the policymaker's preferences are symmetric by testing the null hypothesis of linearity of the reaction function. Also, we estimated the asymmetric parameters in the Central Bank's preferences and tested whether these coefficients are statistically significant.
The Brazilian literature on the Central Bank's reaction function is not very extensive. Silva and Portugal (2001) estimated a Taylor rule for the periods that preceded and followed the inflation targeting regime and concluded that the experience acquired from the inflation targeting regime can be regarded as a case of credibility construction instead of an enhancement of Central Bank's conservatism. Salgado et al. (2005) modeled the Central Bank's reaction function using a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and found different dynamics for the Selic interest rate during and outside the periods of exchange rate crises. Minella et al. (2003) , Holland (2005) , Soares and Barbosa (2006) showed that in the inflation targeting regime the Selic interest rate strongly reacted to expected inflation. Bueno (2005) estimated a Markov-switching reaction function and observed that the response of the Selic interest rate to inflation has been smaller than 1 or negligible for the different monetary policy regimes encountered. Neto and Portugal (2007) This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model and derives the optimal reaction function for the interest rate as a first-order condition for the Central Bank's optimization problem. Section 3 presents the reduced form for the interest rate rule to be estimated in order to check the existence of asymmetries in the monetary authority's objectives. Section 4 shows and analyzes the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The theoretical model
The present paper is theoretically based upon the model proposed by Surico (2007) . The model uses the new-Keynesian structure assessed by Clarida et al. (1999) and allows the monetary authority to have asymmetric preferences with regard to its objectives or targets. Specifically, the monetary authority is allowed to be more averse to negative deviations of the actual output from the potential output and to positive deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target. The presence of these types of asymmetries constitutes the explanation for possible nonlinear responses of the monetary policy interest rate to inflation and output fluctuations. Following Clarida et al. (1999) , we considered an economy whose evolutionary behavior can be described by the following equations: The IS curve, represented by equation (1), is a log-linearized version of consumption Euler equation which is derived from the optimal family decision about consumption/saving, after the imposition of the market clearing condition. The expected future output gap shown in this equation indicates that, since families prefer to cut down consumption over time, the expectation for a higher level of consumption in the future leads to higher consumption in the present, thus increasing the current demand for output.
Structure of the economy
Phillips curve (2) captures the characteristic of staggered nominal prices in which each firm has a probability θ of keeping the price of its product fixed in any time period (Calvo, 1983) . Given that probability θ is supposedly constant and independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment, the average time at which the price is kept fixed is given by 1/1-θ. This discrete nature of price adjustment encourages each firm to set a higher price the higher the expected future inflation. The positive effect of the output gap on inflation reflects the increase in marginal costs produced by excess demand. 1 The aggregate behavioral equations (1) and (2) are explicitly derived from the optimizing behavior of firms and families in an economy with currency and nominal price rigidity (Clarida et al., 1999 
Monetary authority's asymmetric objectives
Suppose that monetary policy decisions are made before shocks e t and u t Therefore, conditional on the information available at the end of the previous period, the monetary authority tries to choose current interest rate i t and a sequence of future interest rates so as to minimize:
subject to equations (1) and (2), where δ is the fixed discount factor. The monetary authority's loss function at time t, L t , is given by:
where π * is the inflation target, λ is the relative weight on the deviation of the output gap from the potential output and μ is the relative weight on the stabilization of the interest rate. The monetary authority is assumed to stabilize inflation around the constant inflation target, π * , to maintain the output gap closed at zero and to stabilize the nominal interest rate around its target, i * .
The linex specification in (6) was introduced by Varian (1974) and included in the analysis of optimal monetary policy by Nobay and Peel (1998) . The advantage of this function is that it allows the policymaker to deal differently with positive and negative output deviations from the potential output and deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target. As shown in Figure 1 , a negative value of γ indicates that the marginal loss associated with a negative output gap is larger than that of a positive output gap with the same absolute value. This occurs because whenever the output gap is positive, the exponential component in loss function (6) dominates the linear component, whereas the opposite is observed whenever the output gap is negative. In this case, the monetary authority is said to have a precautionary demand for economic expansion (Cukierman, 2000 (Cukierman, , 2004 . A positive value of α reveals that the monetary authority has a precautionary demand for price stability, i.e., the marginal loss of a positive deviation of the inflation rate from its target is larger than that of a negative deviation of the same magnitude (see Figure 1 ). Although this behavior is plausible, one should underscore that linex specification (6) does not prevent α from being negative, indicating that a below-target inflation rate is costlier than an above-target one. For the special case in which both γ and α tend towards zero, (6) is reduced to the symmetric loss
Optimization problem (5) is solved under discretion. This implies that the policymaker regards the expectations of future variables as given and chooses the current interest rate, reoptimizing it in each period. Since there is no endogenous persistence in inflation and in output gap, the intertemporal optimization problem can be reduced to a static optimization problem sequence. Therefore, by taking the first-order condition and solving it for i t , we obtain:
where
According to (7), the optimal nominal interest rate at time t reacts nonlinearly to inflation and to the output gap expected for time t. As c 1 and c 2 are both positive, the monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate in response to hikes both in the expected output gap and in the expected inflation rate.
When both γ and α tend towards zero, by using the L'Hôpital's rule, it is possible to show that equation (7) is reduced to the following reaction function:
In this case, the monetary policy interest rate responds linearly to the expected output gap and to the inflation rate expected for period t.
2 From the comparison between equations (9) and (7), we can observe that the presence of asymmetries in the objectives of the monetary authority directly implies a nonlinear interest rate reaction function.
Thus, a way to check the hypothesis of symmetric preferences is to test the functional form of the monetary authority's reaction function.
Reduced-form reaction function
In this section, we derive the reduced form for the interest rate rule to be estimated so as to check the existence of asymmetries in the Central Bank's loss function during the inflation targeting regime. As pointed out by Surico (2007) , the estimation procedures of the model and of the test of the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences (H 0 :γ=α=0) are complex due to the indeterminacy of important parameters and due to the presence of unidentified nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis.
For instance, if γ=α=0, then the coefficients related to the inflation rate and to the output gap in reaction function (7) are indeterminate. In addition, when α=0, the inflation target is an unidentified nuisance parameter, implying that the conventional statistical theory is not available for obtaining the asymptotic distribution of statistical tests under the null hypothesis (Luukkonen et al., 1988; van Dijk et al., 2002) .
To circumvent these problems, we followed the suggestion given by Luukkonen et al. (1988) and linearized the exponential terms in (7) by way of a first-order Taylor expansion around γ=0 and α=0. The result of this procedure is the following reducedform reaction function:
where t ζ is the remainder of the Taylor series approximation.
In order to get to the final specification of the reaction function to be estimated in this paper, we considered two changes to equation (10). First, we introduced two interest rate lags to capture the tendency of the monetary authority towards smoothing the changes in the monetary policy instrument and towards avoiding serial autocorrelation problems. 3 Among the possible explanations to this smoothing, we highlight the following: i) uncertainties over the data and over the coefficients in the monetary transmission mechanism; ii) the policymakers' actions are taken only when they are confident about the results to be produced by these actions; iii) large changes in interest rates can destabilize the financial and exchange rate markets; iv) reversions in monetary policy actions may be seen as errors or evidence of policy inconsistency; v) small but persistent changes in the short-term interest rate cause a remarkable effect of the monetary policy on aggregate demand without requiring excess volatility of this interest rate.
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The second change consists in replacing the expected inflation and output gap values in (10) with their realized values. This way, we obtain the following interest rate reaction function:
where the coefficients d i , i=0,...,4, are given by
And the error term υ t is defined as
From expression (13), we may observe that the term in curly brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and, for that reason, υ t is orthogonal to any variable of the model available in the information set at t-1.
Two important characteristics of reaction function (11) should be underscored. 
In the second alternative specification, we considered that the Central Bank reacts to deviations of the expected inflation from the inflation target. By knowing that the inflation targets for year T and T+1 in the Brazilian inflation targeting regime are disclosed to the policymaker at the beginning of year T, it is plausible to assume that monetary policy actions are taken based on the deviation of expected inflation from the target for the current and subsequent years. Thus, we followed the suggestion given by Minella et al. (2003) and we used the variable Dj, which is a weighted measure of the deviation of the expected inflation for years T and T+1 from their respective inflation targets, i.e.:
where j is the monthly rate, E j π T is the inflation expectation in month j for year T, E j π T+1 is the inflation expectation in month j for year T +1, π 
Finally, we considered nonlinear reaction functions in which the interest rate reacts to the output gap at t-2 and to the deviation of inflation from its target at t-1. This assumption is justified by the fact that the monthly data on inflation and economic activity are only available to the monetary authority with a lag of 1 and 2 periods, respectively. Therefore, we estimated the following specifications:
6 The inflation rate, π t , is the inflation accumulated in the past 12 months, measured by the broad consumer price index (IPCA). 8 For the specification that includes the deviation of inflation from a constant target, we used the mean annual inflation targets. 9 Where inflation targets were time-varying, we interpolated the annual targets in order to obtain the series with monthly frequency.
The variable Dj t present in specifications (16) and (19) is built from inflation targets established for years T and T+1, and from the series of inflation expectations obtained from the survey conducted by the Central Bank at financial institutions and consultancy firms. In this survey, firms are supposed to state the inflation rate they expect for years T (E j π T ) and T+1 (E j π T+1 ).
The output gap (x t ) is measured by the percentage difference between the seasonally adjusted industrial production index (y t ) and the potential output (yp t ), i.e.,
x t = 100(y t -yp t )/yp t . Here, there is an important problem due to the fact that the potential output is an unobserved variable and, for that reason, should be estimated.
Thus, we obtained the proxy variable for the potential output in three different ways:
7 The graphs for the series used are shown in the Appendix. 8 The IPCA is calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and is the price index used by the NMC as benchmark for the inflation targeting regime. 9 In all years, except for 2003, we used the central inflation targets as determined by the NMC. In 2003, the target used was the one adjusted by the Central Bank (8.5%).
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using a linear trend (LT) and using a quadratic Before estimating the reaction function, we ran ADF tests to check the stationarity of the model's variables. We chose the optimal number of lagged difference terms to be included in each regression, k, based on the Schwarz information criterion.
The maximum autoregressive order was equal to 24. For the squares of the three output gap series, the tests included a constant (c), whereas a linear trend (t) was also included for the Selic rate. 
Estimated reaction functions
First, we estimated reaction functions (11), (14) and (16) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the optimal weighting matrix which takes into account possible heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the residuals (Hansen, 1982) . In practice, we used the method proposed by Newey and West (1987) with three lags in order to estimate the variance and covariance matrix. The set of instrumental variables includes six lags for the Selic rate, output gap and inflation rate, lags (-1) and (-3) for the squared output gap, a constant term and the dummy variable D i,t . These instruments imply 14 overidentifying restrictions. We tested the validity of these restrictions by way of Hansen's (1982) J test.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . Specifications (A), (B) and (C) refer, respectively, to specifications with a constant inflation target, with the variable inflation rate and with deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target. On the other hand, specifications HP, LT and QT are related to the use of three different output gap series (x 1t , x 2t e x 3t ) as explained in section 4.1.
Right away, we may note that the estimates for parameter d 3 , which measures the response of the Selic rate to the squared deviation of current inflation (or of the expected inflation) from the target, had a negative sign and were statistically significant in all of the estimated reaction functions. It should be highlighted that a negative coefficient over
indicates that a reduction in the Selic rate in response to a decrease in inflation relative to the target of a given size is larger than the increase of this interest rate caused by an increase in the deviation of inflation with the same magnitude. This behavior is consistent with a Central Bank that has an asymmetric preference that favors an above-target inflation rate.
Due to the nonlinear framework, the responses of the monetary policy instrument to deviations of the current inflation and of the expected inflation from the inflation target are given by: where E(·) indicates the sample mean. Using these expressions and the coefficient values shown in Table 2 , we estimated that the response of the Selic rate to the deviation of inflation from its target was on average equal to 1.52 in specifications A and B, and 3.86 in specification C. This indicates that nonlinear interest rate rules satisfy Taylor's (1993) principle. In addition, the stronger reaction of the monetary policy to the expected inflation concurs with the results obtained by Holland (2005) and Soares and Barbosa (2006) and underscores the forward-looking nature of Central Bank's decisions.
In general, the reaction of the interest rate at the output gap level, measured by parameter d 2 , was nonsignificant. The coefficient over the squared output gap, d 4 , was not statistically different from zero in any of the estimated models. This means that there is no empirical evidence of a nonlinear response of the monetary policy instrument to the output gap.
The last two lines in Table 2 show the p-values (prob) for the joint hypothesis of symmetric preferences and for the hypothesis of validity of overidentifying restrictions.
For all estimated specifications, the hypothesis of a linear reaction function is strongly rejected. This evidence clearly results from the nonlinear reaction of the monetary authority to the deviations of inflation from the target. The results of the J test indicate that the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at a significance level of 10%. Table 3 shows the estimates for the monetary authority's parameters of asymmetric preference. The coefficients were found using expressions α=2d 3 /d 1 and γ=2d 4 /d 2. The standard errors were calculated using the delta method. Consistently with the results shown in Table 2 , we can observe that the coefficients that measure the asymmetry in the preferences over the output gap, γ, were not statistically different from zero. Conversely, the values for the asymmetric parameter regarding the preference over inflation, α, had a negative sign and were statistically significant in all estimated specifications. This indicates that the negative deviations of inflation from the target of a given size cause a greater loss for the Brazilian monetary authority than the positive deviations with the same magnitude. In Table 4 , we provide the estimates for reaction functions (17)- (19), in which the monetary policy instrument depends on the deviation of inflation from the target at time t-1 and of the output gap at time t-2. Initially, we estimated the monetary policy rules using ordinary least squares. As the ARCH test revealed remarkable problems with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, we estimated the reaction functions assuming that the conditional variance of error terms follows an ARMA(p,q) process, where p is the order of the ARCH terms and q is the order of the GARCH terms. The last line in Table 4 shows the orders p and q of the GARCH models estimated by maximum likelihood. Table 4 shows that the asymmetric parameter in the preferences over the output gap, γ, is not statistically different from zero, whereas the coefficient that measures the asymmetry in the preferences over the deviations of inflation from the target, α, is negative and significant in eight out of nine specifications.
In brief, the set of empirical results shown above provides evidence that the Central Bank of Brazil has been more averse a to below-target inflation than to an above-target one. This behavior is the opposite of the one expected by a monetary authority that is more concerned with lending credibility to its disinflationary policy. A possible explanation to this is that the concavity of the reaction function with regard to Notes: * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. n.s Nonsignificant. LB(4) refers to the Ljung-Box statistic for serial autocorrelation of up to the fourth order. ARCH(4) refers to the LM-ARCH statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of up to the fourth order. JB refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic.
Based on this, we decided to estimate nonlinear reaction functions for the period between January 2004 and October 2007. The advantages of using this period are the greater stability of the economic activity, lower predominance of shocks affecting inflation expectations and a larger balance between the number of observations in which inflation was above and below target. Notes: * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. n.s Nonsignificant. LB(4) refers to the Ljung-Box statistic for serial autocorrelation of up to the fourth order. ARCH(4) refers to the LM-ARCH statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of up to the fourth order. JB refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic. Table 5 shows the estimates for the parameters of reaction functions (17) and (19), and for the coefficients of asymmetric preferences of the Central Bank. 12, 13 In general, we observe that only the target estimated for the Selic rate, d 0 , the coefficient of response to the deviation of inflation from the target, d 1 , and the autoregressive coefficients, ρ 1 and ρ 2 , were statistically significant. In addition, we did not find evidence that the Brazilian monetary authority has asymmetric preference over output above or below the target. Finally, we noted that the coefficient that measures the asymmetric preference over the stabilization of inflation, α, had a positive but not significant sign. This finding suggests that Central Bank's asymmetric preferences over an above-target inflation may be associated with monetary policy actions taken in periods in which domestic crises strongly affected inflation and inflation expectations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we assessed possible asymmetries in the Central Bank's objectives by estimating nonlinear reaction functions for the interest rate. To achieve that, we 
